A description of the Soviet military's views on the importance of civil defense in a future war. These views derive from an image of war in which the opponent's will to resist and economic capability to continue the struggle are primary targets for attack. The importance of such targets increases in the event of a protracted war, whose occurrence is regarded by the Soviets as sufficiently likely to justify considerable investment in a civil defense program designed to permit the Soviet Union to survive and to seek to win strategic nuclear superiority in the course of the war. (See also RM-3223.)
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