A Memorandum on a continuous two-person, zero-sum game. Colonel Blotto and the enemy are confronted with a situation in which (1) Blotto has at his disposal a total of B units of attack, (2) the enemy has E units of like character, and (3) they are to attack simultaneously and in full force a set of [n] hills of different values, with prescribed payoffs. (See supplement, RM-424.)
This report is part of the RAND Corporation research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.