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Suppose that a group of individuals, each of whom is a Bayesian, is required to make a joint decision, and that although the individuals all agree on the utility function for the problem, they disagree on the prior distribution of the relevant states of nature. The Memorandum introduces an axiom of group rationality — namely, that to an outsider the decisions of the group appear like the decision of a Bayesian — and explores its implications when the group decisionmaking procedure either can or cannot be amended.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.