Cover: Maximum C-130E Tactical Airlift Capability : COMBAT SAMPLE.

Maximum C-130E Tactical Airlift Capability : COMBAT SAMPLE.

Published 1969

by S. H. Miller, J. A. Hamilton, P. A. Mason

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An analysis of C-130E tactical airlift capability for various types of intratheater airlift operations. Using COMBAT SAMPLE data and assuming no resource or operational constraints, an analytic model is used to compute the maximum capability (in flying time per aircraft per day) of a squadron flying four different tactical airlift missions. For scheduled, or on call, random request operations (considered the most "typical"), the Air Force planner can expect no more than 5.6 flying hours per C-130E per day; for austere, preplanned operations, about 7.3; and for area support operations, about 6.3. A SAMSOM II simulation model is used to determine how maximum airlift capability is affected by reducing direct maintenance manpower. Simulations show that 500 to 625 assigned maintenance men would allow maximum capability; 400 to 435, 90 to 98 percent; 225 to 255, 60 to 70 percent; and with 100 assigned maintenance men, a squadron of 16 aircraft could achieve only 10 to 25 percent of its maximum capability. (See also RM-5821.) 72 pp. Ref.

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