Understanding Russian Black Sea Power Dynamics Through National Security Gaming
ResearchPublished Oct 13, 2020
During a June 2018 original RAND Black Sea security game, subject-matter experts role-played regional governments during a military crisis scenario to explore Russian military, economic, and political levers of power in the Black Sea. The game and associated research underscored Russia's relative strength in the Black Sea and challenges associated with developing a coherent response to Russian aggression in the region.
ResearchPublished Oct 13, 2020
Russian military investment in its Black Sea posture since 2014 has profoundly altered the security map of the region. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has taken some steps to assert presence in the Black Sea, the United States and regional allies may have a limited set of military options with which to further expand existing defense and deterrence measures.
This report describes a June 2018 RAND Black Sea security game that convened subject-matter experts and policy practitioners to role-play Russia and U.S. allies and partners during a military crisis scenario. The game and associated research underscored the relative strength of Russia's position in the Black Sea and the challenges associated with developing a coherent response to Russian aggression in the region. Politically, the game highlighted the extent to which a Russian goal of preventing regional cooperation may be easier to achieve than the task of building regional consensus. Russia may strategically apply tailored pressure and incentives to the other five littoral states that would likely further undermine unity around multilateral action. Before a crisis, the United States and its allies should consider steps to address the regional military imbalance while amplifying engagement with Black Sea allies and partners across a range of issues, including energy security, media independence, and trade opportunities, as well as regional threat perceptions and contingencies.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI).
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