Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 3.3 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.4 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Research Synopsis

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback152 pages $37.95 $30.36 20% Web Discount

Research Questions

  1. What are the top-priority DoD biosurveillance programs, missions, desired outcomes, and associated performance measures and targets?
  2. How does the current array of program assets contribute to achieving the top-priority missions?
  3. Is the current funding system appropriate and can it be improved to ensure stable funding?

In the context of the 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) asked the Department of Defense (DoD) to review its biosurveillance programs, prioritize missions and desired outcomes, evaluate how DoD programs contribute to these, and assess the appropriateness and stability of the department's funding system for biosurveillance. DoD sought external analytic support through the RAND Arroyo Center. In response to the questions posed by OMB request, this report finds the following:

  • Current DoD biosurveillance supports three strategic missions. Based mostly on existing statute, the highest-priority mission is force health protection, followed by biological weapons defense and global health security.
  • Guidance issued by the White House on June 27, 2013, specified priorities for planning fiscal year 2015 budgets; it includes an explicit global health security priority, which strengthens the case for this as a key DoD biosurveillance strategic mission.
  • DoD biosurveillance also supports four desired outcomes: early warning and early detection, situational awareness, better decision making at all levels, and forecast of impacts.
  • Programs and measures that address priority missions — force health protection in particular — and desired outcomes should be prioritized over those that do not do so.
  • More near-real-time analysis and better internal and external integration could enhance the performance and value of the biosurveillance enterprise.
  • Improvements are needed in key enablers, including explicit doctrine/policy, efficient organization and governance, and increased staffing and improved facilities for the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC).
  • AFHSC has requested additional funding to fully implement its current responsibilities under the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. Additional responsibilities for coordinating the entire DoD biosurveillance enterprise would need concomitant resourcing.
  • There is not a single, unified funding system for the DoD biosurveillance enterprise; the multiple current funding systems would likely benefit from an organizing mechanism with the authority to manage and control funds to meet enterprise goals.

Interim guidance issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on June 13, 2013, is significant because it is the first policy to explicitly address biosurveillance; it adopts the definition from the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, calls for development of a DoD Directive for biosurveillance, and specifies tasks for DoD's implementation of the Strategy.

Key Findings

DoD biosurveillance supports three strategic missions. Based mostly on existing statute, the highest-priority mission is force health protection, followed by biological weapons defense and global health security.

  • However, guidance issued by the White House on June 27, 2013, specified priorities for planning fiscal year 2015 budgets related to the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats and the associated Global Health Security second-term agenda; this explicit White House priority strengthens the case for the global health security mission.

DoD biosurveillance also supports four desired outcomes: early warning and early detection, situational awareness, better decision making at all levels, and forecast of impacts.

Programs and measures that address priority missions — force health protection in particular — and desired outcomes should be prioritized over those that do not do so.

More near-real-time analysis and better internal and external integration could enhance the performance and value of the biosurveillance enterprise for DoD decision makers, especially for current situational awareness.

Improvements are needed in key enablers, including the need for explicit doctrine/policy, efficient organization and governance, and increased staffing and improved facilities for the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC).

  • AFHSC has requested additional funding to fully implement its responsibilities under the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. Additional responsibilities for coordinating the entire DoD biosurveillance enterprise would need concomitant resourcing.

There is not a single, unified funding system for the DoD biosurveillance enterprise; the multiple current funding systems would likely benefit from an organizing mechanism with the authority to manage and control funds to meet enterprise goals.

Recommendations

  • Prioritize programs and measures that address priority missions, especially force health protection, and desired outcomes.
  • Pursue more near-real-time analysis and better internal and external integration of the biosurveillance enterprise to enhance its performance and value.
  • Improve key enablers, such as explicit doctrine/policy, efficient organization and governance, and increased staffing, funding, and improved facilities for the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center.
  • Establish a single, unified funding system for the DoD biosurveillance enterprise.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    OMB Task 1 — Missions and Outcomes

  • Chapter Three

    OMB Task 2 — Performance

  • Chapter Four

    OMB Task 3 — Funding

  • Chapter Five

    Conclusions

  • Appendix A

    Documents Reviewed

  • Appendix B

    Mission Authorities

  • Appendix C

    DoD Biosurveillance Systems and Assets

  • Appendix D

    GEIS Network and Partners

  • Appendix E

    DMSS Data Feeds

  • Appendix F

    Biosurveillance Outputs

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.