Jan 5, 2018
This report introduces and explains a game-theoretic methodology to help decisionmakers assess the potential effects of alternative approaches to space control. Specifically, we sought to develop a methodology to identify those defensive space control options that would likely contribute to deterrence without increasing political costs and risks of escalation.
U.S. space capabilities are at risk. Potential adversaries are well aware that U.S. transformational warfighting capabilities are increasingly reliant on support from space systems. As a result, they may be developing offensive space control (OSC) weapons to hold U.S. space systems at risk in crisis or attack them in war. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the United States has stated it will defend its space systems.
The objective of the research in this report is to help the Air Force assess the deterrent value of alternative defensive space control (DSC) options. Specifically, we sought to develop a methodology to identify those DSC options that would likely contribute to deterrence and those DSC options that would likely generate escalation dynamics or political costs that could further imperil U.S. interests.
This report should be of interest to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel developing capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems. It should also be of interest to other U.S. government personnel responsible for developing and implementing national and DoD space policies and strategies.
Explaining the Methodology
Types of Analysis
Interpreting the Outcomes of Game-Theoretic Analyses
Observations, Applications, and Recommendations
Modeling the Assessment