In this report, the authors examine Russian arms exports and the impact of sanctions designed to discourage third country purchases and raise the cost of future Russian malign interference in other nation-states. The authors draw from publicly available information compiled in a database to illustrate when U.S. diplomatic engagement or the prospect of U.S. sanctions has led third countries to reconsider importing Russian weapons.

Impact of the U.S. and Allied Sanction Regimes on Russian Arms Sales

John V. Parachini, Ryan Bauer, Peter A. Wilson

ResearchPublished Nov 18, 2021

In this report, the authors examine Russian arms exports and the impact of sanctions designed to discourage third country purchases and raise the cost of future Russian malign interference in other nation-states. The authors draw from publicly available information compiled in a database to illustrate when U.S. diplomatic engagement or the prospect of U.S. sanctions has led third countries to reconsider importing Russian weapons. The data set used for this report contains 65 cases in 33 countries of Russian arms export negotiations and sales, beginning in July 2017 and ending in May 2021; these cases illustrate that, as U.S. officials acknowledge, the monetary value of lost Russian arms sales due to U.S. diplomatic efforts buttressed by the prospect of third-party sanctions is difficult to determine with precision.

However, there are several examples of countries that clearly entertained purchasing Russian weapons and then, because of the chilling effect of possible sanctions, demurred and opted not to do so. Analysis of these cases indicates that diplomatic outreach to arms-buying countries will likely be most effective when it acknowledges the legacy of Russian arms exports; the desire to assert independence from Russia and/or the United States; and the availability of suitable, competitively priced alternatives to meet buyers' security needs. To better meet the objectives of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the United States must ensure that foreign officials and publics receive a narrative focused mainly on the harm caused by Russian malign behavior rather than the threat of U.S. sanctions.

Key Findings

  • While the cost to Russia of U.S. diplomatic efforts buttressed by the prospect of third-party sanctions is difficult to determine with precision, there is no question that the "chilling effect" has resulted in Russia losing arms sales.
  • Countries with significant portions of their military arsenal composed of Soviet Union and Russian weapons systems, such as Vietnam and India, face formidable challenges in quick diversification away from Russian systems; even countries eager to diversify away from Russian systems may find it difficult and costly to do in the short run.
  • Countries that do not have legacy arsenals composed of Soviet and Russian systems may be more amenable to eschewing Russian arms export offers if suitable, competitively priced, and politically desirable alternatives are available.
  • Diplomacy paired with the prospect of sanctions will likely be most effective when it acknowledges the legacy of Russian arms exports to certain countries; the desire to assert independence from the influence of Russia and/or the United States; and the availability of suitable, competitively priced alternatives to meet buyers' security needs.

Recommendations

  • The United States will need to approach diplomatic discussions strategically with governments that have large quantities of former Soviet or Russian weapons in their arsenal—especially states with which the United States has other important or even vital interests.
  • The United States should choose strategically when to leverage the prospect of sanctions, when to issue a waiver, and when to demur on the issue of sanctions altogether.
  • The United States, European Union, and like-minded nations need to provide credible diplomatic and military alternatives to Russian arms exports and work with countries to address their security needs; this effort might be aided by recasting the diplomatic narrative to focus on Russian malign behavior rather than U.S. sanctions.

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Parachini, John V., Ryan Bauer, and Peter A. Wilson, Impact of the U.S. and Allied Sanction Regimes on Russian Arms Sales, RAND Corporation, RR-A1341-1, 2021. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1341-1.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Parachini, John V., Ryan Bauer, and Peter A. Wilson, Impact of the U.S. and Allied Sanction Regimes on Russian Arms Sales. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1341-1.html.
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