Connector Survivability in the Current Operating Environment
ResearchPublished Oct 4, 2023
Survivability is a critical consideration for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of amphibious connectors. Current operating concepts and an evolving threat environment demand that the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps re-evaluate survivability of connectors in their analysis for the current and future fleet. Connectors that were deemed survivable for missions in a different threat environment might not be survivable when operating against an evolved adversary.
ResearchPublished Oct 4, 2023
China and Russia are widely acknowledged as near-peer threats to the United States and its allies. Engagement with these adversaries could involve amphibious operations of various degrees. New U.S. Marine Corps strategies and the need for more expeditionary flexibility by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force require modernization of U.S. capabilities in source—port, ship, shore—to objective movement in contested environments. Amphibious ship-to-shore connectors fall into this category, but might not provide sufficient lift, survivability, and speed for future requirements. Survivability is a critical design component of the U.S. Navy's fleet of amphibious connectors. Current operating concepts and an evolving threat environment demand that the Navy and Marine Corps reevaluate survivability of connectors in their analysis for the current and future fleet. Connectors that were deemed survivable under different concepts in a different threat environment might not be as survivable when they operate in a contested environment against an evolved adversary.
The Navy and Marine Corps must address the survivability of their current fleet of amphibious combat craft, which they rely on for maneuver and sustainment of troops and large equipment. Current operational concepts—distributed maritime operations (DMO), Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Stand-In Forces (SiFs)—recognize a new threat environment, and current requirements for survivability might not be sufficient for this environment.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Navy and Marine Forces Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
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