Hazard Abatement as a Function of Firm Size
The Effects of Internal Firm Characteristics and External Incentives
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Using survey data collected from 2,000 members of the National Federation of Independent Business, the author examines which factors influence firms to manage hazards in the workplace. The author constructs a simple economic model of the decisionmaking process firms use to manage hazards to structure the survey data collected from firms of various sizes in high- and low-risk industries. The model classifies the factors that affect hazard management decisions into two groups: (1) external incentives for hazard management (e.g., the worker’s compensation program and OSHA) and (2) internal characteristics of the firm (e.g., management attitudes and firm capabilities). Using descriptive and tabular analysis and multiple regression analysis of the determinants of hazard abatement actions, the author finds that the likelihood of hazard abatement actions increases with firm size and industry risk levels. The significance and magnitude of the substantive variables in the regression model support the hypothesis that firm-size variation in abatement actions is due to differences in the internal characteristics of the firm and differences in the external incentives for hazard abatement across the firm-size continuum.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Hazard Management Decisions: A Conceptual Framework and Research Hypothesis
Chapter Three
Internal Structure of the Firm
Chapter Four
External Incentives for Hazard Management Decisions
Chapter Five
Research Results
Chapter Six
A Simple Policy Analysis
Appendix One
The NFIB Survey Instrument
Appendix Two
Tabulations of NFIB Survey Responses Shown in Figures
Appendix Three
Logistic Regressions of Separate Abatement Actions
Research conducted by
This document was submitted as a dissertation in November 1988 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Frank A. Camm (Chair), James N. Dertouzos, and Richard B. Victor.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Dissertation series. Pardee RAND dissertations are produced by graduate fellows of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, the world's leading producer of Ph.D.'s in policy analysis. The dissertations are supervised, reviewed, and approved by a Pardee RAND faculty committee overseeing each dissertation.
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