News Release
Changes Needed in Way the United States Conducts Military Interventions
Oct 2, 2008
Lessons Learned and Best Practices
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This report reflects a joint effort of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the RAND Corporation, growing out of a decade's worth of experience, principally gained by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union, in military interventions abroad and their aftermath. The project brought together senior practitioners from a wide variety of institutions and disciplines (including U.S., allied, coalition, and United Nations military leaders, U.S. and European diplomats, and representatives of private-sector and nongovernmental organizations) to determine what people who were actually involved in operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have learned about “getting the job done.” This report is a compilation, a synthesis, and an analysis of lessons learned and best practices regarding the integration of civilian and military intervention across the full spectrum of activities from the time before military intervention takes place through to post-conflict nation-building. It provides guidance for the U.S. and international institutions regarding critical areas of foreign policy and national security in the 21st century.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Discussion and Recommendations
Chapter Three
he U.S. Dimension
Chapter Four
International Cooperation
Chapter Five
Eighteen Basic Principles for Success
Appendix A
Afghan Policy Action Group
Appendix B
ISAF Regional Command and PRT Locations
Appendix C
Biographies of Panel Members
This project was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center (ISDP) of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) in cooperation with the American Academy of Diplomacy. NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Conference proceeding series. RAND conference proceedings present a collection of papers delivered at a conference or a summary of the conference.
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