Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union

Understanding an Evolving Problem

John V. Parachini, David E. Mosher, John C. Baker, Keith Crane, Michael S. Chase, Michael Daugherty

ResearchPublished May 13, 2005

Since the early 1990s, the United States has been concerned about the diversion of expertise and sensitive information from the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons complexes of the former Soviet Union (FSU). This documented briefing offers an assessment of the threat of diversion from the FSU and examines each of its key components, including the nation-states and individuals who seek to illicitly acquire NBC weapons expertise and the institutions and individuals who already have it. The authors argue that the threat goes beyond just scientists to highly skilled technicians, retirees, and key administrative and support personnel who can provide sensitive information. The authors further argue that applying a simple supply-and-demand model to the problem of proliferation overlooks the critical role that various barriers and disincentives to proliferation have played in keeping the actual number of cases of diversion low.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2005
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 66
  • Paperback Price: $25.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-3758-9
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/DB457
  • Document Number: DB-457-DOE

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Parachini, John V., David E. Mosher, John C. Baker, Keith Crane, Michael S. Chase, and Michael Daugherty, Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem, RAND Corporation, DB-457-DOE, 2005. As of September 11, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB457.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Parachini, John V., David E. Mosher, John C. Baker, Keith Crane, Michael S. Chase, and Michael Daugherty, Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005. https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB457.html. Also available in print form.
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The research described in this briefing was prepared for the United States Department of Energy. This research was conducted within the RAND National Security Research Division, which conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. intelligence community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.

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