A study of insurgency and counterinsurgency with special attention to the Algerian rebellion as it was viewed from high quarters in the French government. The study is based in the French experience with the insurgencies of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the Organisation de l'Armee Secrete (OAS) in Algeria and results from the author's participation in that experience.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Document series. The RAND Document (D), a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1970, was an internal working paper written as a step in a continuing study within RAND, which could be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at any time.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.