Right-sizing Incentives

Edward N. Okeke, Isa Sadeeq Abubakar

ResearchPosted on rand.org Jun 8, 2026Published in: Journal of Development Economics, Volume 183, 103834 (September 2026). DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103834

This paper presents results from a field experiment in Nigeria in which expectant mothers were offered cash payments of N2500, N4000 or N10000 conditioned on using formal medical care. A secondary intervention provided some mothers with an information signal about their pregnancy risk. We find highly non-linear effects of conditional payments—most of the incentive effect occurs on the extensive margin, with rapidly diminishing returns to incentive size. We also uncover new spillover effects: showing that incentives increase healthcare use in childhood by index children and by other children in the household. We find largely null effects of the information signal.

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Document Details

  • Availability: Non-RAND
  • Year: 2026
  • Pages: 20
  • Document Number: EP-71359

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