Download
Download eBook for Free
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.5 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add to Cart | Paperback220 pages | $25.00 | $20.00 20% Web Discount |
Can the U.S. Navy save money by increasing its use of simulators without sacrificing readiness? The authors look at the use of simulators in the Air Force, the Marines, and French and British forces to see if the Navy's current mix of simulator and live training should be changed substantially for the first time since the 1970s. After presenting the data for each service branch and type of simulator, the authors conclude that the Navy must first decide how it wants to measure readiness before an increased use of simulators will yield tangible returns in the form of increased proficiency at lower cost.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Training
Chapter Three
Trade-Offs Between Live and Simulated Training
Chapter Four
Observations and Recommendations
Appendix A
U.S. Navy F/A-18 Fighter Training for Strike Missions
Appendix B
U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Unit Training
Appendix C
USAF F-16 Training
Appendix D
Allied Training
Appendix E
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and ASW Training
Appendix F
Surface Ship ASW Training
Research conducted by
The research described in this report was performed under the auspices of RAND's National Security Research Division.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Monograph report series. The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.