This report describes a theoretical framework of the enlistment process that accounts for the joint role of counselors, the person-job-match algorithm, and the supply of recruits in determining the number of enlistments, occupation, term of service and enlistment benefits chosen. Using hypotheses generated by this framework, the authors conducted empirical analysis. Results indicate that the counselor incentive plan is cost-effective in filling occupations and priority jobs when compared with educational benefits and enlistment bonuses for recruits. However, the plan should be changed to provide more challenge for the counselor and to reward counselors on the basis of individual, not group, productivity.
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) under RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
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