Report
Evaluating the Combat Payoff of Alternative Logistics Structures for High-Technology Subsystems
Jan 1, 1988
Flexible Support for the Force-Projection Army's High-Technology Weapons
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The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the Army's logistics system must be revolutionized to make it leaner and more responsive to the requirements of the 21st century. To help identify alternatives that will make the logistics system more capable of meeting the revolutionary challenge, the report examines the three operations the Army has been recently involved in: Operation Just Cause (OJC) in Panama and Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Desert Storm (ODSt) in Southwest Asia. Although these operations were substantial successes, in both logistics and, of course, combat terms, there is the question of how robust the logistics support the Army provided its deploying forces was. This study explores the robustness inherent in the Army's current logistics concept by analyzing the consequences of extending the three recent missions in challenging ways: (1) What if the fighting had lasted longer in OJC? (2) What if fighting had broken out early in ODS? and (3) What if the operating tempo of IDSt had been more demanding? Our intent is to determine whether the Army can rely on the logistics structure in possible future operations and, if not, to determine what capabilities the Army should demand of its future logistics systems.
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