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Security force assistance, specifically the development of Afghanistan's security forces, is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces, specifically, the Afghan military, police, and intelligence services. It covers the time period from 1920–1989, with specific focus on the period of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, from 1979–1989. To do so, it draws on Western, Soviet, and Russian historical sources and interviews in Kabul and Moscow with individuals involved on the Soviet side and on the Afghan side. It concludes with comparisons with and lessons for ongoing security force assistance in Afghanistan.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Historical Overview: 20th-Century Security Aid to Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion
Chapter Three
The Soviet Advisory Mission in the 1980s: Senior Leadership and Reporting Channels
Chapter Four
MoI and KhAD Security Forces During the 1980s
Chapter Five
The Afghan Military
Chapter Six
Militias and Other Forces
Chapter Seven
Afghan Security Forces Challenges and Responses
Chapter Eight
The Soviet Decision to Withdraw and the Legacy of Soviet Efforts to Build Afghan Security Forces
Chapter Nine
Conclusion: Parallels, Disconnects, and What the International Security Assistance Force Can Learn from the Soviet Experience
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The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by RAND Arroyo Center.
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