New Counterinsurgency Assessment Methods Are Needed to Better Inform Policymakers
May 3, 2012
Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency
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Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process — contextual assessment — that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process.
Concepts That Shape Counterinsurgency Assessment
Centralized Assessment Theory and Pattern and Trend Analysis
The Effects-Based Approach to Assessment
Choosing Core Metrics
Assessment in Afghanistan
Why Does Centralized Assessment Fail in Counterinsurgency?
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Options
A Proposed Alternative to Centralized Assessment
Contextual Assessment Template
Notional Example of a Brigade/Regimental-Level Contextual Assessment
Phong Dinh Province Report
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Military Assessment, September 1967
Debate over Effects-Based Operations
The research described in this report was prepared for the U.S. Government. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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