Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations

Eric Peltz, John Halliday, Marc Robbins, Kenneth Girardini

ResearchPublished 2005

The major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have been judged from virtually all quarters as a remarkable success, although accompanied by some perceptions that this success was achieved in the face of severe logistics problems. This monograph describes how Army forces were sustained during Operation Iraqi Freedom, examines how well this support performed, and discusses the effects on operations with an emphasis on the period from the start of ground combat to the fall of Baghdad. The findings should be of interest throughout the Army as well as the broader Department of Defense supply chain, deployment planning, and force development communities. The findings have implications for the design of the logistics system, logistics process improvement efforts, future force design and warfighting concepts, and the acquisition of end items such as vehicles as well as logistics enablers such as those that provide logistics situational awareness.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Peltz, Eric, John Halliday, Marc Robbins, and Kenneth Girardini, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG344.html.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

This publication is part of the RAND monograph series. RAND monographs were products of RAND from 2003 to 2011 that presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs were subjected to rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.