Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing
Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities
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The United States participated in several interventions and state-building efforts during the 1990s, and the rationale for U.S. engagement in such efforts received a new urgency after the 9/11 attacks. However, recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq, especially, have shown that engaging in stability and reconstruction operations is a difficult and lengthy process that requires appropriate resources. Most of all, to have a chance of succeeding, such operations require a realistic understanding of the capabilities needed for them.
The authors present the results of research on the U.S. civilian personnel and staffing programs for stability and reconstruction operations undertaken in other countries under U.S. leadership or with the participation of the United States. The study uses the Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework to assess the personnel requirements for such operations. The Framework advocates strategic alignment, workforce planning and development, leadership and knowledge management, results-oriented performance culture, talent management, and accountability. The authors also present recommendations that the U.S. government should consider undertaking to deal with the types of problems that the United States has encountered in post-2003 Iraq. The research draws on the rapidly growing body of literature dealing with reconstruction and stability missions, interviews with U.S. and British civilian personnel deployed to Iraq, and the authors’ own experiences in Iraq as U.S. civilians involved with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The study should be of interest to policymakers dealing with stability and reconstruction operations.
Table of Contents
Motivation and Approaches
What Capabilities Does the United States Need?
Process, Structure, and Management — What Can Be Done Today?
Conclusions and Recommendations
Creating a Civilian Staff in Iraq, 2003–2004