This Note describes a large-scale program melding rule-based modeling and traditional simulation in the problem domain of game-structured military strategic analysis. It then draws on the program's experience to discuss paradigms from artificial intelligence, concepts and techniques for representing knowledge in a policy domain having no body of acknowledged experts or experimental data, and lessons from managing the related research and software development. Finally, it discusses implications for the possibility of using policy analysis to reflect concepts of bounded rationality and organizational behavior.
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