Download

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 4.8 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback93 pages $30.00 $24.00 20% Web Discount

For the past 40 years, deterrence — the U.S. threat to employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in defense of American interests — has been the central feature of a grand strategy of containment concentrated particularly on Europe. In the face of revolutionary changes in the Soviet bloc, the containment strategy is viewed as a success. This Note assesses the relevance of deterrence in the context of an exploration of American grand strategy. It describes the assumptions that underlay the strategy of containment devised in the decade following World War II and explains containment's subsidiary diplomatic, economic, and defense strategies. It outlines the requirements of deterrence in terms of the perceptions of three audiences — the Soviets, U.S. allies in Europe, and the American public as represented in the Congress. It then describes the efforts of successive administrations to implement the defense strategy, analyzes the current situation in Europe in the context of containment's long-term objectives, and outlines a new grand strategy.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation note series. The note was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1979 to 1993 that reported other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.