The tri-border area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia is a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia. The authors analyze the security environment in the region, examine the Philippines' Coast Watch System, and consider the prospects for forming an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBA.

Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia

The Coast Watch System of the Philippines

Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk

ResearchPublished May 17, 2012

The tri-border area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia is a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia, a well-known transit zone for weapons and explosives, and a principal logistical corridor for local and transnational terrorist groups. The authors analyze the security environment in the TBA; evaluate the Philippines' Coast Watch System, designed to improve maritime domain awareness in the Philippine archipelago; and examine the challenges the system must overcome. Finally, they consider the prospects for forming an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBA.

Key Findings

The Territory and Territorial Seas of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia Constitute a Single Geopolitical Space

  • Long-standing ties facilitate commerce and social relations among the populations of the region, but they are also conducive to transnational dissident, terrorist, and criminal activity.
  • Vast areas lie outside government control, and ethno-national, ideological, and religious conflicts exacerbate the void in governance.

The Philippines Is Moving to Promote and Enhance a Transparent and Effective Means of Coastal Surveillance in and Around the Region

  • The Coast Watch System (CWS), a collaborative initiative involving the United States, Australia, and the Philippines, aims to develop a common operating picture of the maritime domain in the Philippines.
  • Its purpose is to collect, consolidate, and integrate all data relevant to maritime security and provide real-time information for locating, apprehending, and prosecuting those who engage in illegal maritime activities.
  • The system's future will depend on Manila's ability to sustain CWS stations that are up and running; ensure proper integration and connectivity for those that are nearing completion; and acquire necessary equipment, such as long-range surveillance platforms and sensors.

Recommendation

  • The Coast Watch System must evolve beyond the Philippine-centric character that it currently exhibits if it is to fulfill the type of comprehensive maritime domain awareness that it is supposed to engender.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2012
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 48
  • Paperback Price: $20.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-7066-1
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/OP372
  • Document Number: OP-372-OSD

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RAND Style Manual
Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk, Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines, RAND Corporation, OP-372-OSD, 2012. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP372.html
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Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk, Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012. https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP372.html. Also available in print form.
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