The study of a problem in tactical air war concerned with the allocation at each strike of the tactical forces among such competing air tasks as counterair, air-defense, and support of ground operations. A two-person multimove game is formulated in which the allocation decisions of the combatants represent the moves of the game. The game model assumes that counterair missions destroy enemy forces, air-defense missions reduce the enemy's counterair operations, and support of ground operations contributes to the payoff. The optimal allocations derived from the game-theoretic analysis of this model are described, and possible implications of the results for operational gaming are discussed.
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