A discussion of the difficulty in accomplishing political direction of the military in rapidly escalating nuclear crises. From the study of hypothetical crises by means of hand-played games, it is found that differences in responsibilities, perceptions, and operational styles between the political and military agencies result in inconsistencies between decisions and actions. It is also found that the political leaders are often deficient in adapting policies to the command-control constraints emerging during interactions with military sections.
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