Terrorism and the Nuclear Safeguards Issue
ResearchPublished 1976
ResearchPublished 1976
Terrorism for the most part is not mindless violence. Mass casualties do not serve the terrorists' goals and could alienate the population. Thus the detonation of a nuclear bomb or the deliberate dispersal of toxic nuclear material seem the least likely terrorist threats. However, terrorists might contemplate carrying out low-level nuclear incidents and hoaxes. The inconvenience and political repercussions will probably exceed the actual danger to public safety. At a far more gradual rate the possibilities of serious nuclear incidents may increase simply because the number of nuclear facilities will increase, and technical knowledge regarding nuclear devices will spread. Before then, however, more effective safeguards can be developed.
This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.