U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence
Expert InsightsPublished 1977
Expert InsightsPublished 1977
Summary of the literature over the past five years, to clarify the issues and identify the points of disagreement regarding the contribution of strategic nuclear forces to U.S. deterrence against the Soviet Union. The review is organized around the following basic questions: What kinds of enemy actions can nuclear weapons deter? How much strategic balance and counterforce and countervalue capabilities are needed to deter? How necessary is the triad for deterrence? How are uncertainty, stability, and flexibility related to deterrence? How can SALT improve deterrence? The author gives his own critical comments and closes by suggesting important questions needing further study.
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