An Evaluation of the Implementation and Perceived Utility of the Airman Resilience Training Program
RAND Health Quarterly, 2014; 4(2):12
RAND Health Quarterly, 2014; 4(2):12
RAND Health Quarterly is an online-only journal dedicated to showcasing the breadth of health research and policy analysis conducted RAND-wide.
More in this issueSince 2001, the U.S. Military has been functioning at an operational tempo that is historically high for the all-volunteer force in which service members are deploying for extended periods on a repeated basis. Even with the drawdown of troops from Iraq in 2011, some service members are returning from deployment experiencing difficulties handling stress, mental health problems, or deficits caused by a traumatic brain injury (TBI). In response to these challenges, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has implemented numerous programs to support service members and their families in these areas. In 2009, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs asked the RAND National Defense Research Institute to develop a comprehensive catalog of existing programs sponsored or funded by DoD to support psychological health and care for TBI, to create tools to support ongoing assessment and evaluation of the DoD portfolio of programs, and to conduct evaluations of a subset of these programs. This article describes RAND’s assessment of an Air Force program, Airman Resilience Training (ART), which is a psychoeducational program designed to improve airmen’s reactions to stress during and after deployment and to increase the use of mental health services when needed. ART was initiated in November 2010, replacing a previous program named Landing Gear, which had been in place since April 2008. The RAND study took place from August 2011 through November 2011. This study will be of particular interest to officials within the Air Force who are responsible for the psychological health and well-being of airmen, as well as to others within the military who are developing programs for service members to help them cope with stress while in combat situations and after returning from deployment.
Since 2001, the U.S. Military has been functioning at an operational tempo that is historically high for the all-volunteer force. Even with the 2011 drawdown of troops in Iraq, servicemembers have been experiencing stressful and frequent deployments, which are increasing stress and strain on relationships and the general psychological well-being of servicemembers and their families. In response to these challenges, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has implemented numerous programs to support servicemembers and their families in this area. In 2009, the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury asked RAND to help identify and examine the effectiveness of DoD-sponsored programs designed to support servicemembers and their families. One such program is Airman Resilience Training (ART), developed by the Air Force's Office of Deployment Psychological Health and implemented in November 2010. It replaced its predecessor, Landing Gear, which had been in place since April 2008.
ART is a psycho-educational program that aims to provide deploying airmen with tools and techniques to improve their ability to cope with stressful events and to facilitate their smooth reentry into work and family life upon returning from deployment. It is delivered in a workshop or class setting and consists of a set of PowerPoint briefing slides and accompanying training manual. The briefing provides information to the briefer on the content of the slide and recommends types of examples or illustrations to share with the audience. ART can be delivered in a variety of locations; briefers are allowed to be flexible in their approach; and the installation can determine the frequency and scheduling of classes based on the airmen's deploying and reintegrating schedules. All Air Force deployment sites (installations or bases that deploy airmen) are required to provide resilience training to their deploying and reintegrating airmen. ART fulfills this requirement. Although ART is the Air Force's official resilience training briefing, installations are allowed to use any other resilience training program that suits the needs of their deploying airmen, but ART is required for reintegrating airmen.
This study had two objectives: (1) to ascertain the extent to which ART was being implemented according to its original design and (2) to gauge its potential usefulness and value as perceived by deploying and reintegrating airmen and mental health professionals. This study does not directly evaluate the program's effectiveness in promoting resilience. Instead, the study is an implementation evaluation, which aims to describe how ART is being implemented and to provide insight into its potential to meet its intended goals of improving resilience, reducing stress, and improving help-seeking behavior among airmen.
To fulfill the study's objectives, the RAND team employed a case study design in which we observed the delivery of ART and conducted interviews and discussion sessions in four Air Force installations that utilize ART. From August 2011 through November 2011, RAND conducted site visits to assess how ART was implemented in four deployment centers and to document how useful airmen and mental health professionals at those installations consider ART.
With the assistance of staff in the Air Force's Office of Deployment Psychological Health, RAND selected four installations to be used as sites for this study. These sites were selected based on a number of strategically chosen criteria to ensure that we captured diversity in installations' (1) location in the United States, (2) organizational function or mission (defined as Major Command), and (3) size of military population. We opted to use data-driven purposive sampling in order to include cases that would reveal a variety of possible implementation scenarios, as opposed to random sampling (Stake, 1995).
We collected data during our site visits through three activities: (1) structured observations of ART briefings, (2) discussion sessions with deploying and reintegrating airmen after they were briefed, and (3) interviews with the installation's chief mental health provider and his or her staff.
To capture the variation in how ART was implemented across the four sites and perceptions of ART's usefulness for discussion session participants and mental health staff, we summarized information gathered from discussion session conversations and interviews with mental health staff at each site and then coded the information along major themes of interest, noting any consistencies or differences across the sites. We are cautious not to generalize our interpretation of the data beyond the four sites that participated in the study.
We found that ART was provided to airmen in the same setting (within the deploying and reintegration checklist process), but that its delivery varied. Some briefers followed the slides closely and some exemplified ART points or content with relevant statistics or anecdotes, as recommended in the training manual. No ART sessions included significant participant discussion as recommended in ART instructions, no airmen ever asked any questions, and most airmen appeared disengaged with the briefings, as exemplified by distracted behaviors, including texting on cell phones, closing eyes and putting their heads on tables or desks, and occasional chatting among peers.
By design, the members of the Mental Health Office that brief ART are allowed discretion in how to deliver ART depending on the needs of the airmen in the audience. However, across our sites, the ART briefings were delivered differently not based on the airmen's purported needs, but for the following reasons:
Discussion session participants reported that they did not recall much content from the ART briefing and most reported that they did not consider the information provided in ART to be useful for promoting their resilience or reintegration. They suggested several reasons for this:
The study's findings suggest that at the four sites, there may be opportunities where ART can better meet its intended goals to promote the resilience of deploying airmen and to support the smooth reintegration of airmen returning from deployment. Given these findings, we suggest two ways that the Air Force could improve ART. Given the limited empirical evidence for resilience-building tactics or programs, we do not make suggestions for how the Air Force should conduct resilience training, but rather suggest that the Air Force focus on internal quality improvements by (1) conducting a needs assessment to identify the most appropriate goals for ART as well as an assessment to identify overlapping efforts within the Air Force on resilience training and (2) consider modifying ART's content and delivery based on our study participants' suggested strategies.
Given our findings that many airmen and mental health professionals reported that the ART session was not considered very useful and was possibly redundant with airmen's prior training or other briefings, we suggest that the Air Force conduct two types of assessments to best determine the goals, content, and structure of ART that will ensure that it is providing appropriate content in an effective and efficient manner. First, a needs assessment may not only gauge the current gaps in resilience training for airmen but may also identify a more targeted audience who may be at higher risk for experiencing stress while in theater or reintegrating into work and family life. If areas of resilience training most pertinent to these airmen are identified, the assessment could help determine how ART should address the needs of servicemembers who may benefit most from the training. Once the array of airmen's needs is determined, the Air Force could conduct another assessment to ascertain the extent of overlap in the content of resilience-related trainings currently provided by individual installations, Major Commands, and across the Air Force. The goal of such an assessment would be to redesign ART to be less redundant with other efforts and to repeat training material only when repetition is needed to improve learning or for specific groups that are at a high risk of encountering psychological health issues.
If the goals of ART remain the same as they are now, we offer some suggestions for improving upon its current content and delivery as part of ongoing quality improvement efforts. We suggest ways the Air Force might improve ART to better meet the needs of deploying and reintegrating airmen, recognizing the variety of deployment and combat-related experiences across the Air Force. We base our suggestions for improvement on the findings from our site visits, on the evidence base for program effectiveness, and the limited scientific literature on resilience. Before deciding to modify ART, it is important for the Air Force to consider the feasibility of implementing any changes.
Suggestions for improving the content of ART are based on the perceived needs and impressions of airmen who participated in the interviews and discussion sessions in this study and the limited scientific literature on resilience training. Since there are no empirically demonstrated resilience-building tactics or programs that provide strong scientific guidance regarding modifications to content, these suggestions should be seen as part of a process of internal quality improvement.
Delivery of ART (as currently structured) could be improved to ensure that airmen are more attentive to the training and therefore more likely to fully absorb and process its content. We draw these suggested improvements from the perceptions, experiences, and impressions from airmen in our site visits as well as from the established research on program implementation.
These suggestions could improve the Air Force's resilience training by creating a program that is more engaging, skills-focused, targeted to those at risk, and memorable, while placing less of a workload on mental health care providers.
Stake, R. E., The Art of Case Study Research, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995.
The research described in this article was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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