Performance Rewards for Services to the Employable Poor
A Proposed Incentive Pay System for California Job Agents
ResearchPublished 1972
A Proposed Incentive Pay System for California Job Agents
ResearchPublished 1972
Describes a plan for compensating California job agents through an incentive pay system. Incentive rewards depend upon improvements in clients' earnings brought about through services provided by job agents. The standards against which job agents' performances are judged are predictions of how long their clients would have been unemployed and what their wages and job stability would have been had they not received job agent services. The predictions are based on the employment experiences of a control group of persons similar to job agent clients who have never seen job agents. Job agents will compete on the basis of how much clients exceed established standards. The system provides management and job agents with a consistent means of evaluating performance. The methodology used to develop the incentive pay system can also be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a variety of manpower programs as well as other "case responsible" personnel within the manpower system.
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