Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of Market Games

by Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik

Download

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.5 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback28 pages $20.00 $16.00 20% Web Discount

A contribution to the study of abstract market games, building on the model first introduced in RM-5671. The competitive outcomes of an economic system are known, under quite general conditions, always to lie in the core of the associated cooperative game. It is shown here that every "market game" (i.e., one that arises from an exchange economy with money) can be represented by a "direct market" whose competitive outcomes completely fill the core. It is also shown that it can be represented by a market having any given core outcome as its unique competitive outcome, or, more generally, having any given compact convex subset of the core as its full set of competitive outcomes. (See also RM-5671, R-1476, R-904/4.)

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Report series. The report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.