Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War
Jan 1, 1984
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This report reviews Soviet impressions of Israeli air operations during the 1982 Lebanon war. It evaluates a 1983 article published in Soviet Air Force Monthly (whose audience includes Soviet aircrews), that assesses the implications of the Israeli-Syrian air battles. For Western audiences, the article provides insights into how the Soviets have interpreted the Beka'a Valley experience. It appears that the Soviets have either deliberately misrepresented Israel's air combat results to their own pilots or else failed to comprehend the tactical lessons suggested by Israeli combat performance.
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