Many managers and executives responsible for weapons acquisition, both in industry and the Department of Defense, argue that regulations are inhibiting the timely and economical development of weapon systems. This report presents quantitative analyses of the effects of regulations and controls on management practices and overall outcomes of weapons acquisition projects. The authors conclude that, on the basis of currently available information, it is not possible to correlate regulatory activity and program outcomes--no cause-and-effect relationships can be inferred.
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