The insurgency in Iraq is increasingly carried out by paid-for-hire recruits and youth. The authors of this piece believe that to counter this, U.S. forces must focus their efforts at preventing the enemy foot-soldiers from enjoining the battle and, on the other end, disengaging them — or dissuading, deterring, and turning them when possible. Only such a novel and proactive approach will yield the results we desire.
Originally pubished in: Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 5, May 2006.
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