Report
Price-Based Acquisition: Issues and Challenges for Defense Department Procurement of Weapon Systems
Oct 5, 2005
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has recently experimented with changing the way it purchases major weapon systems. Typically, the government uses a cost-based acquisition (CBA) approach, which bases the price for developing and producing a weapon system on certified cost data that the contractor must supply. Critics of CBA argue that it imposes heavy regulatory burdens on the government and contractors and discourages potential civilian firms from competing for government projects. Under price-based acquisition (PBA), the government asks contractors to bid for projects without having to provide exhaustive data on what the system actually costs. Proponents suggest that PBA can shorten development schedules and reduce government and contractor overhead costs by eliminating the steps necessary for reporting and analyzing cost data. PBA is also thought to lower the prices for major weapon systems by allowing contractors to benefit from efficiencies and by making it attractive for more civilian contractors to compete. DoD has endorsed the use of PBA in the Air Force and other military services.
Unfortunately, a lack of empirical data about the implementation of PBA has made it difficult for policymakers to know whether PBA ultimately holds the benefits that are claimed for it and what challenges truly exist. RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) carried out a study of PBA experiences in DoD and among private defense contractors to provide a better understanding of how DoD can best use PBA approaches.
DoD has implemented PBA in conjunction with other reform measures, making it difficult to measure the benefits. PAF found little compelling, quantifiable evidence that PBA saves overhead costs or shortens the contracting and oversight processes, although some contracting experts believe that at least some savings have been achieved. It is also difficult to discern the role of PBA, by itself, in increasing contractor incentives to reduce cost. On certain types of programs with long-term production pricing agreements, the elimination of certified cost data has reduced government and contractor workloads, but on a small scale. Finally, there is little convincing evidence that the use of PBA has encouraged more civilian commercial firms to compete for DoD contracts for major military-unique items.
This research brief describes work done for RAND Project AIR FORCE.
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