Compound Simple Games II

Some General Composition Theorems

by Lloyd S. Shapley

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One of a series of studies concerned with solutions for certain types of games of strategy, important because of their use in a variety of conflict situations-economic, political, and military. This Memorandum investigates solutions of the type of compound game formed when the players of a given m-person game are replaced by m committees, each having its own special voting rule or other method of reaching a decision. Relationships are established between the solutions of the compound game, and the solutions of the original game and the m committee games.

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