Report
What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank
Sep 29, 2015
What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen?
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ما العوامل التي تدفع الأفراد إلى رفض التطرف العنيف في اليمن؟
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Research Questions
- Why do some individuals engage in political violence in Yemen, while others do not?
- Specifically, why do some individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen?
- What factors motivate individuals to reject political violence?
- How can policymakers strengthen nonradicalization?
Why do some individuals engage in political violence in Yemen, while others do not? In this report, the third in a series on this topic, the authors examine the role that social, political, and economic factors play on individual behavior toward violence in the midst of Yemen's bloody and multiyear civil war. This report uses a unique national survey conducted in Yemen in 2016, amidst active fighting, to better understand why Yemenis may reject political violence despite persistent conflict and civil unrest across the country. The report addresses how the U.S. government and its partners can strengthen efforts to undermine violent extremism in Yemen, with implications for future countering violent extremism programs worldwide.
Key Findings
The Best Way to Undermine Violent Extremism Is the Strengthen Those Factors That Motivate Individuals to Reject Political Violence
- Choosing not to engage in violence is attitudinally distinct from opposing political violence in theory.
- Urban centers represent important populations for strengthening nonradicalization.
- Yemenis perceive attacks against local civilians as more legitimate than attacks against foreigners, including aid workers.
- Social ties, measured by the degree of influence exerted by family, friends, and religious leaders, also do not affect individual radicalization in one clear direction.
- Yemenis view political violence as a form of activism, so redirected pathways — or participation in nonviolent activism — do not diminish a propensity for violence.
Recommendations
- U.S. countering violent extremism programs should emphasize the difference between actual willingness to engage in violence and theoretical support for violence more generally.
- In Yemen, diplomatic and military efforts should focus on helping partner nations reduce civilian casualties to limit support for further violence on the ground.
- Diplomacy should be used to reinforce the cessation of hostilities in urban centers by encouraging actors on the ground to avoid repressive security measures.
- More research is needed to better understand Yemeni attitudes toward the civil war as a predominantly local conflict, and the impact of the global rhetoric of the Islamic State and al Qaeda.
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Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Overview of Conflict and Instability in Yemen
Chapter Three
Methodology and Data
Chapter Four
Results
Chapter Five
Findings and Implications
Appendix
Survey and Sampling
Research conducted by
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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