A RAND Corporation study undertook a literature review and analysis of several case studies to examine factors that could increase the likelihood of success in integrating active and reserve component military staff organizations. The resulting best practices can serve as a framework for undertaking and assessing these integrations.
Integrating Active and Reserve Component Staff Organizations
Improving the Chances of Success
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Research Question
- What factors could increase or decrease the likelihood of success in integrating active and reserve component staff organizations?
Integrating active and reserve component military staff organizations — for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency, making standards and practices more consistent, or ensuring commonality of purpose — can present significant challenges. A RAND Corporation study undertook a literature review and analysis of several case studies to examine factors that could increase the likelihood of success in such organizational integrations. The resulting best practices can serve as a framework for undertaking and assessing these integrations.
Key Finding
The Literature on Organizational Change and Cases Studies Suggest Several Best Practices That Can Improve the Chances of Successfully Integrating Active and Reserve Component Staff Organizations
- Those best practices are as follows: Establish the need and the vision for change; create a coalition to support the change; communicate the vision; develop an implementation strategy, including goals and measures; link the vision and structure; embed the changes in the new culture; manage the integration of cultures; maintain momentum; remember the importance of people; assess progress and adjust accordingly; establish unity of command; address statutory barriers; and collocate active and reserve component personnel in integrated organizations.
Recommendations
- Establish the need and the vision for change. Articulate the need for change, and adopt a clear vision for the integration.
- Create a coalition to support the change.
- Communicate the vision. Communicate the vision for the integration regularly.
- Develop an implementation strategy, including goals and measures. Develop a strategy for implementing the integration that includes clear goals and measures of success.
- Link the vision and the structure. Ensure that the planned organizational structure is consistent with the vision for the integration.
- Embed the changes in the new culture.
- Manage the integration of cultures. Work to develop a total force culture in the integrated organization.
- Maintain momentum.
- Remember the importance of people.
- Assess progress and adjust accordingly.
- Establish unity of command. Establish unity of command to the greatest extent possible in the integrated organization.
- Address statutory barriers. Explicitly consider statutory barriers and potential work-arounds.
- Collocate active and reserve component personnel in integrated organizations.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
The Total Force and Total Force Integration
Chapter Three
Integrating and Changing Organizations Successfully
Chapter Four
Active and Reserve Component Integration in the Air Force
Chapter Five
Active and Reserve Component Integration in the Army
Chapter Six
Active and Reserve Component Integration in the Coast Guard
Chapter Seven
Active and Reserve Component Integration in the Marine Corps
Chapter Eight
Active and Reserve Component Integration in the Navy
Chapter Nine
Findings and Recommendations for Future Integration Efforts
Research conducted by
This research was sponsored by the Office of Reserve Integration within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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