Estimating Potential Savings in Department of Defense Activities
ResearchPublished Feb 11, 2019
There is a push to make the U.S. government run like the private sector. Alternatives to this approach that attempt to account for the complexity and uniqueness of the U.S. Department of Defense are presented in this report. Recommendations include that estimates of savings should be based on identifying and removing specific barriers as a way to increase effectiveness and efficiency in specific aspects of defense operations.
ResearchPublished Feb 11, 2019
There has been and continues to be a push to make the U.S. government "run more like a business." This desire is predicated on the assumption that businesses generally operate more efficiently and productively than government agencies; therefore, by adopting businesslike modes of operation, government functions will cost less and be less of a burden to taxpayers. This push extends to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which continues to commission studies of how much it might save (and how) given experiences in the private sector. In two studies, increased productivity applied across the board to both labor and nonlabor costs was estimated to yield savings totaling as much as $125 billion over five years. While these studies are aspirational and help identify ideas that could yield savings for DoD, the authors of this report found that the productivity assumptions on which their estimates were based do not account for a number of important effects. Thus, DoD may overstate savings that can be achieved in the near term.
The authors found that alternative approaches to productivity-based estimates that take DoD's complexity and unique mission-driven needs into consideration would produce more-feasible estimates of potential savings. While savings — perhaps substantial — in defense activities may be possible to achieve, estimates of their size should be based on identifying and removing specific barriers as a way to increase effectiveness and efficiency in specific aspects of defense operations.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.