Assessment of the Proliferation of Certain Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
Response to Section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
ResearchPublished Jun 14, 2018
RAND Corporation researchers performed a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact that certain remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), governed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, and their proliferation to U.S. adversaries have on U.S. national security interests and U.S. allies and partners, as well as export controls that might affect that proliferation. In this report, they document their findings.
Response to Section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
ResearchPublished Jun 14, 2018
Section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 requires an independent assessment, directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the impact that certain remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) governed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have on U.S. national security interests. The NDAA requires that this evaluation, in the form of a report, be delivered to the congressional defense committees. The congressional language specifically requires that the assessment include evaluation in six areas: (1) a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the scope and scale of the proliferation of RPAs that are category I items (that is, those presumed not to be exportable) under the MTCR; (2) an assessment of the threat that the proliferation of such aircraft among adversaries poses to U.S. interests; (3) an assessment of the impact that the proliferation of such aircraft has on the combat capabilities of and interoperability with allies and partners of the United States; (4) an analysis of the degree to which the United States has limited the proliferation of such aircraft as a result of the application of a "strong presumption of denial" for exports of such aircraft; (5) an assessment of the benefits and risks of continuing to limit exports of such aircraft; and (6) such other matters as the chair considers appropriate. This report contains the results of the researchers' findings and assessment.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Intelligence and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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