The illicit antiquities market is fueled by a well-documented rise in looting at archaeological sites and a fear that the proceeds of such looting may be financing terrorism or rogue states. In this report, the authors compile evidence from numerous open sources to outline the major policy-relevant characteristics of that market and to propose the way forward for developing policies intended to disrupt illicit networks.
Tracking and Disrupting the Illicit Antiquities Trade with Open Source Data
- What do the actors, networks, and markets that enable the looting, trafficking, and sale of antiquities look like?
- What data sources can be used to assess the structure and transaction volume of the illicit antiquities market?
- What are the potential strategies and data sources that would guide more-effective enforcement?
The illicit antiquities market has become an area of concern for policymakers. It is fueled by a well-documented rise in looting at archaeological sites and a fear that the proceeds of such looting may be financing terrorism or rogue states. Efforts to craft effective policy responses are hindered by the lack of data and evidence on two fronts: the size of the market and the network structure of participants. In lieu of reliable evidence on these two fronts, the conversation has been dominated by speculation and hypotheses and has generated some widely accepted theories of how the illicit antiquities market operates.
In this report, the authors compile evidence from numerous open sources to outline the major policy-relevant characteristics of that market and to propose the way forward for developing policies intended to disrupt illicit networks. The approach uses multiple methods and data sources, with the understanding that no single piece of evidence can provide a complete picture of the market and that only by cross-referencing and triangulating among various sources can salient market characteristics be illuminated.
- The market size is smaller than often reported.
- Market structure varies widely, but it often appears ad hoc and opportunistic.
- The West is not the only end market for looted antiquities.
- Technology used in the looted antiquities trade is mostly unsophisticated.
- Policy responses should address a decentralized network that relies heavily on trust and communications between buyers and sellers who do not have an ongoing personal relationship.
- Increase fear of law enforcement by sharing stories that highlight the risks of illicit trades or accounts of sting operations.
- Increase skepticism about fakes and replicas by highlighting the lack of specialists in the network and noting recent examples of doubt about the authenticity of high-profile antiquities.
- Undermine trust by increasing the perceived threat of surveillance on messaging and transaction platforms.
- The methods demonstrated in this report should be applied and validated in other research contexts.
Table of Contents
Antiquities Trafficking and Its Role in Financing Terrorism
Smuggling Networks and Sales Channels: Results from Interviews
Antiquities Trafficking Online
Measuring the International Trade in Antiquities
Policy Responses to Illicit Trafficking and Future Research
Archaeological Looting in Historical Perspective
Detecting Suspicious Dealers Using Rare Indicator Coins
A Supply and Demand Theory of the Antiquities Market
Research conducted by
- Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
HSOAC is a federally funded research and development center operated by the RAND Corporation under contract with DHS.