Achieving Peace in Northern Mali
Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement
ResearchPublished May 1, 2015
This report examines the prospects for stabilization in Mali following the political and military crisis that began in 2012. To this end, it examines Mali's peace settlements since the early 1990s to identify flaws and successes. The report also explores whether Mali's neighbor Niger owes its current stability to a more favorable context, shrewd policies, or sheer luck, and whether it might offer a model of resilience for Mali.
Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement
ResearchPublished May 1, 2015
This report examines the prospects for stabilization in Mali following the political and military crisis that began in 2012. To this end, it examines Mali's peace settlements since the early 1990s to identify flaws and successes. The authors find that five recurrent issues have impeded the implementation of successive accords: the lack of representativeness of the peace-accord signatories; a flawed understanding of decentralization and democracy; the limited perceived legitimacy, in the north, of Bamako; persistent insecurity; and an absence of transitional justice and reconciliation. The report recommends building representativeness through a variety of measures to simultaneously address these issues and help craft a peaceful way forward for Mali. The report also explores whether Mali's neighbor Niger owes its current stability to a more favorable context, shrewd policies, or sheer luck and whether it might offer a model of resilience for Mali. The authors recommend emulating some of the policies that could account for Niger's sustained stability, such as better integration of Tuareg populations and a focus on development programs in addition to security, while recognizing that these do not make Niger impervious to a resurgence of the political turmoil it experienced in the past.
This research was sponsored by the Office of African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.