Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.8 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

It has long been thought that the United States education system is the great equalizer, lifting less advantaged children out of poverty and improving their chances for success in adulthood. The opportunity for economic and social mobility depends heavily, however, on access to high quality education. Recent research has raised concerns about degradation in the quality of schools serving higher-poverty neighborhoods: The achievement gap between low- and high-poverty students appears to have widened over the last quarter century (Reardon, 2011). In response to these concerns, federal, state, and local officials have enacted countless education reforms to improve the outcomes of low-income students. This dissertation examines two of those reforms to better understand how and if they are working.

The first paper focuses on California's state education accountability reform, which allowed the state to identify low-performing schools and target improvement efforts. The paper concentrates on a previously unstudied potential consequence of the reform: Whether the information on school academic performance, which had been previously unavailable, enabled voters to hold local leadership accountable.

The second and third papers assess a comprehensive reform to improve teacher and principal talent in high-poverty, low-performing schools. While the reform has various components, its main features are recruitment, retention, and performance bonuses for teachers and principals in schools with a greater concentration of high-poverty students. The third paper expands on these findings by exploring whether improving the talent within a school has an effect on student outcomes. Results suggest that while the program was not effective during the first three years of implementation, in the fourth year it shifted student performance by 0.28 standard deviations.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Does Information Change Voter Behavior? An Analysis of California’s School Board Elections

  • Chapter Two

    Can recruitment and retention bonuses attract teachers to low performing schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina

  • Chapter Three

    Can principal and teacher bonuses improve student achievement? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina

Research conducted by

This document was submitted as a dissertation in July 2014 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Jim Hosek (Chair), Paco Martorell, and Jennifer McCombs.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation dissertation series. Pardee RAND dissertations are produced by graduate fellows of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, the world's leading producer of Ph.D.'s in policy analysis. The dissertations are supervised, reviewed, and approved by a Pardee RAND faculty committee overseeing each dissertation.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.