CANES Contracting Strategies for Full Deployment
ResearchPublished May 24, 2012
Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the U.S. Navy's Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) system, which is intended to give the Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks across the fleet. Recommends a multiple-contract model that assigns the technical, production, and installation functions to the organizations that can provide the best value.
ResearchPublished May 24, 2012
The Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) system is the U.S. Navy's next generation of networks and computing infrastructure, primarily for use on ships. It is intended to give the Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) networks across the fleet. This report discusses contracting strategies for the main hardware component and integration capabilities that will be used with the CANES system. Contractors will design the CANES, identifying specific hardware and developing the integration software necessary to consolidate existing command, control, communications, computers and intelligence functions. The authors examined a number of other government procurement programs and propose five potential contracting alternatives — a single prime contractor, three multiple contract models, and an all-government option. They recommend a multiple-contract model that assigns the technical, production, and installation functions to the organizations that can provide the best value, requires active and continuous government involvement, obtains frequent competitive prices for information technology hardware, and uses proven Navy processes to install the system on warships.
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This publication is part of the RAND technical report series. RAND technical reports, products of RAND from 2003 to 2011, presented research findings on a topic limited in scope or intended for a narrow audience; discussions of the methodology employed in research; literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; and preliminary findings. All RAND technical reports were subject to rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.