Will Putin Stop at Ukraine?

In the spring of 2024, Western leaders began issuing dire warnings about the threat posed by Russia to NATO allies. During his 2024 State of the Union speech, President Joe Biden addressed the assembled lawmakers: "If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not." Biden was far from alone. "It cannot be ruled out that within a three- to five-year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO's solidarity," said Denmark Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius echoed this assessment: "we have to take into account that Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country one day." While a Russian attack is not likely "for now," the minister added: "Our experts expect a period of five to eight years in which this could be possible." Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went one step further, arguing Europe was in a "pre-war era."

Some might dismiss these statements about the Russia threat as rhetorical flourishes that have scant direct impact on policy. Others may see them as attempts to spur complacent Western political systems—and sluggish Western military industries—into action to counter Russia that have little downside. But the leaders' assertions reflect four increasingly widespread and influential assumptions in the transatlantic community: first, that Russian reconstitution is proceeding rapidly, giving it the capability to attack NATO in the near future; second, that NATO's deterrent against a risk-acceptant Russia is inadequate; third, that the organizing principle for the alliance's military planning and broader strategy should be to counter opportunistic Russian aggression; and finally, that a Russian "win" in Ukraine will embolden the Kremlin and imperil NATO's security. These assumptions are now motivating proposals to take a hardline approach toward Russia after the Ukraine war ends.

In this article, we assess these four assumptions, and find each questionable. They have led to a focus on planning for opportunistic Russian aggression after the Ukraine war has ended while ignoring other, potentially more plausible pathways to NATO-Russia conflict, such as war resulting from first-strike pressures or an escalation of a second full-scale Russia-Ukraine war. We argue that allies should not optimize their posture and strategy around a single, highly unlikely scenario. Instead, we propose a postwar strategy toward Russia focused on preventing the more likely pathways to a NATO-Russia war, responding to threats below the threshold of armed conflict, and ultimately stabilizing the security environment on the continent. That strategy would entail taking steps to avoid a NATO-Russia war that results from misperception and minimizing the chances of conflict recurrence in Ukraine, along with maintaining a robust force posture that could respond effectively in a contingency. The objective is a more stable NATO-Russia dynamic in the context of what will be a continued—and likely bitter—rivalry. For the alliance, this is not just a matter of correcting leaders' talking points. Advanced planning for the aftermath of major wars is a crucial endeavor. While the Russia-Ukraine war is not (as of this writing) a systemic conflict akin to the two World Wars or the Cold War, choices made even following regional wars have resulted in arrangements that forge lasting patterns of international relations. An empirically grounded portrait of the Russia threat should drive NATO's planning for the day after the Russia-Ukraine war ends.