This report documents an examination of the planning phase of the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, to determine the extent to which the Army's reengineering of planning and programming was successful and to suggest improvements.
Table of Contents
The Context of TAP
Reengineering Army Programming
Analysis of TAP 00-15: What Was Accomplished
Revising TAP 02-17
Conclusions and Recommendations For TAP 02-17
Linkages Among JV2010, AV2010, and ASPG
Translating Guidance from the ASPG to TAP
Mission Area Tables
Strawman Operational Objectives
Strawman Operational Capabilities
Hierarchy of Mission Areas, Objectives, Capabilities
This research was conducted within RAND's Arroyo Center.
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