News Release
Navy Should Start Next Nuclear Submarine Design Phase Early to Prevent Engineering Brain Drain, RAND Study Finds
May 7, 2007
Format | File Size | Notes |
---|---|---|
PDF file | 1 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Format | File Size | Notes |
---|---|---|
PDF file | 0.2 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Format | List Price | Price | |
---|---|---|---|
Add to Cart | Paperback234 pages | $40.00 | $32.00 20% Web Discount |
For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stretching out the design of the next submarine class and starting it early, or, if that seems too risky, sustaining design resources at the shipyards, their vendors, and in the Navy itself that exceed those supported by the demand.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
The Submarine Design Process
Chapter Three
Framing the Analysis
Chapter Four
Effect of Different Options for Managing Design Resources
Chapter Five
Critical Skills
Chapter Six
Suppliers
Chapter Seven
The Navy’s Roles and Responsibilities in Submarine Design
Chapter Eight
Effect of a Design Gap on the Navy’s Technical Community
Chapter Nine
Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendix A
Workforce Simulation Model
Appendix B
Survey Instrument for Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Newport News
Appendix C
Survey Instrument Provided to Vendors
Appendix D
U.S. Navy’s Technical Warrant Holders
Appendix E
Net Present Value Analysis
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.