Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.8 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

全文 (中文简体)

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 10.4 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback102 pages $28.00

Navy and Marine Corps Sea Basing concepts envision the development of capabilities that will allow the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of expeditionary forces from the sea. The RAND Corporation assessed alternative structures for the proposed Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron and how these changes would affect abilities to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in operations ranging from counterinsurgency to special operations to major combat operations. This assessment of the capabilities of alternative structures for the MPF(F) considers the need for both logistics support and casualty evacuation and care in assessing MPF(F) capabilities. Most of the variations considered entail removing large-deck ships from the squadron. RAND researchers also explored the possibility of an MPF(F) construct where only surface connectors, and no aircraft, could be used for supporting a MEB. The researchers found that degradation to logistics throughput resulting from eliminating large-deck ships from the MPF(F) could be offset by substituting CH-53K helicopters for MV-22s, with air connectors from other ships also helping provide adequate throughput capacity. Although eliminating all large-deck ships would also eliminate major medical capabilities, the squadron would otherwise retain the ability to provide logistics support for a full range of major combat, counterinsurgency, and special operations.

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This report is part of the RAND monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.