Strategies to Improve Detection of Novel Pandemic Pathogens
Cost Versus Detection Performance for Promising Pathogen-Agnostic Detection Workflows
RAND Health Quarterly, 2026; 13(2):9
Cost Versus Detection Performance for Promising Pathogen-Agnostic Detection Workflows
RAND Health Quarterly, 2026; 13(2):9
RAND Health Quarterly is an online-only journal dedicated to showcasing the breadth of health research and policy analysis conducted RAND-wide.
More in this issueThis RAND analysis compares three pathogen-agnostic biosurveillance strategies—syndromic, wearable, and environmental—using modeling to assess cost versus detection performance. Environmental sampling detected outbreaks fastest, followed by wearable sensors, although both lost advantage with highly transmissible or symptomatic diseases. Limited pilot deployments could refine real-world costs and validate early-warning performance.
Detecting novel pathogens is a significant challenge for biosurveillance systems, in part because they rely on pathogen-specific detection technologies. Decisionmakers planning to improve biosurveillance systems using pathogen agnostic technologies lack evidence on their expected costs and the expected detection performance of alternative surveillance system designs. Investment in improved biosurveillance systems is limited by a lack of clarity on cost versus performance, as well as complex implementation choices.
This study introduces a model of three biosurveillance strategies, referred to as Syndromic, Wearable, and Environmental. Each of these is a pathogen-agnostic workflow designed to detect novel threats via metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS). The Syndromic and Wearable strategies are initiated by a signal from symptomatic or physiological sensors (respectively), while the Environmental strategy runs continuously and is intensified responsively based on external intelligence from event-based surveillance. First, we parameterize this model to emulate the detection of wildtype SARS-Cov-2. Then, we explore how changes in pathogen characteristics and technology performance change key detection and cost measures. We inform our model with parameters derived from the literature, and publicly available information on fixed, operating, and variable costs of disease surveillance activities.
This study provides insight into the tradeoffs inherent to the design of biosurveillance systems by simulating three alternative strategies. Our modeling approach requires a set of assumptions about the pathogen being detected (i.e., transmissibility and disease progression), the detection technology (i.e., sensitivity of alternative detection systems) and how it would be used in a real-world setting. This simplified setting and treatment of strategies as discrete choices is intended to capture key features of a deployed military population and provide rough cost versus performance analysis as one input for choosing a novel surveillance system. Across all scenarios, we assume the existence of a baseline biomedical capability, including access to standard diagnostics, and basic outbreak investigation procedures. A real-world implementation would build on this existing infrastructure, and likely deploy the strategies considered here in combination rather than atomically.
This research was independently initiated and conducted within the Center on AI, Security, and Technology of RAND Global and Emerging Risks using income from operations and gifts and grants from philanthropic supporters. A complete list of donors and funders is available at www.rand.org/CAST.
More in this issueRAND Health Quarterly is produced by the RAND Corporation. ISSN 2162-8254.
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