Optimal Employment of Tactical Air Forces in Theater Air Tasks — II:

A Game-Theoretic Analysis

by Leonard David Berkovitz, Melvin Dresher


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A problem concerned with allocating aircraft among three different air tasks — counterair, air defense, and support of ground operations — in a multistrike campaign as a two-sided war game. Previous studies assumed that in any strike of the campaign each plane allocated to air defense prevents one attacking plane from fulfilling its counterair mission. This Memorandum removes this assumption and derives the optimal strategies as a function of the air defense kill potential.

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